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Government Auditing Standards Comment 
Independence Exposure Draft 
U.S. General Accounting Office 
Room 5X16 (FMA) 
441 G Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20548 
 
Comments on May 4, 2001 Exposure Draft on Auditor 
Independence 
 
The staff of the Independence Standards Board is pleased to have 
the opportunity to comment on the GAO’s proposed changes to 
Government Auditing Standards relating to auditor independence.  
Our comments reflect solely the views of the ISB staff, and do not 
purport to represent the views of the Board or of any individual 
Board members. 
 
We agree that the Exposure Draft is a significant improvement over 
the April 2000 “Preliminary Views.”  However, we believe that, as 
important as it is, auditor independence in the context of  
Government Auditing Standards does not warrant a separate full 
body of knowledge.  Rather, we suggest accepting the recent SEC 
and ISB rules, which have gone through extensive due process, and 
supplementing them as appropriate for the unique environment of 
governmental auditing (e.g., for “organizational” considerations).  If 
adopted, your rules should clearly discuss this approach and, where 
your rules differ, the reasoning for those differences.  This “conform 
and supplement” approach would minimize the difficulties of the 
currently proposed approach. These difficulties include the need for: 
(a) users and preparers of audited information to understand these 
differences in the independence rules for what appear to be similar 
circumstances, (b) you to maintain and interpret a complete set of 
rules, and (c) auditors to keep current with another separate set of 
rules and interpretations which would involve significant costs to the 
firms without compensating benefits.  For your information, we 
have made a similar recommendation to the AICPA. 
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Our detailed comments on the Exposure Draft are attached. 
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Independence Standards Board 
Detailed Comments on the U.S. General Accounting Office’s  
May 4, 2001 Exposure Draft 
 
 
3.11 In our draft “Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence,” we have tentatively 
defined “auditor independence” as: 
 
both (a) independence of mind – freedom from the effects of threats to auditor 
independence that would be sufficient to compromise an auditor’s objectivity and (b) 
independence in appearance – avoidance of activities, relationships, and other 
circumstances that would lead well-informed investors and other users reasonably to 
conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an auditor lacks independence of 
mind. 
 
We believe the use of a common definition would be very helpful to users of audit  
reports, auditors, and regulatory agencies. 
 
Beyond just the benefits of common professional usage, there are specific reasons for 
changing your proposed second general standard. Specifically: 
“free…from…impairments…” implies an absoluteness beyond what is either necessary 
or attainable in practice. In addition, “free…in fact” implies an objectively determinable 
matter which is not consistent with much of auditor independence literature, which 
necessarily deals with feelings and beliefs.  Hence, our use of the term “independence of 
mind.” 
 
3.12 The restriction in this paragraph applies to “independence of mind,” but seems to omit 
the important “appearance” aspect of the definition. 
   
3.13 This paragraph also lacks specific reference to perceptions of independence. Furthermore, 
the second sentence of the paragraph refers to a footnote describing the information that 
should be reported in the scope section of the auditor’s report if the auditor’s 
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independence is impaired.  Because this important requirement needs additional 
emphasis, we recommend that you incorporate it into the body of the rule, and that the 
required wording explicitly state “we are not independent” (similarly to the AICPA’s 
SSARS-1 paragraph 22 requirement for compilations). We do not believe that disclosure 
of “any compensating actions taken to minimize the impairment” should be required or 
permitted.  If the auditor still is not independent after the “compensating actions,” then 
disclosure of them will mislead users of the audit report. 
 
3.15 The proposed requirements on using the work of a specialist appear to be more restrictive 
than those of related AICPA requirements at AU 336.10-.11.  We presume those 
additional requirements are intended; it would be informative if the final document 
articulates the reasons why you believe they are necessary.  In addition, the proposal 
requires a more strict treatment for a specialist’s impairment of independence of mind 
than of appearance.  If the specialist’s independence is impaired in appearance, is that 
sufficiently less important than the specialist’s impairment of independence of mind, so 
as to result in a different conclusion? 
 
3.16-.19 “Personal Impairments” – We believe this important section is unclear in a  
         number of substantive ways.  If these concerns are not addressed by adopting  
         SEC/ISB rules (which would have the added benefit of specifically addressing legal     
         services and internal audit services), we urge that the following concerns be  
         addressed: 
 
A. The section is entitled “Personal Impairments,” and yet it includes an  
                     unclear and unrelated collection of selected impairments for “individual”  
                     auditors and for “audit organizations.”  Activities and relationships of both     
                     individuals and firms/audit organizations (e.g., financial interests and  
                     employment, and firm investments and non-audit services, respectively) can    
                     compromise independence.  To provide effective and helpful guidance, the    




1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 
(212) 596-6133  fax (212) 596-6137 
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org 
 
B. When these rules are intended to place restrictions on individual auditors (as 
opposed to their audit organizations), they do not specify which individuals they 
restrict.  Are they intended to restrict those in a position to influence the attest 
work, only individuals on the attest engagement, all individuals in the audit 
organization, or whom? 
 
C. While 3.14 and footnote 2 require “public accountants” additionally to follow 
AICPA (and state board) independence rules, which cover numerous areas not 
addressed in these rules, it seems that auditors employed by the government are 
not so restricted.  In any case, the list of restrictions outside of the “public 
accountant” rules is incomplete.  A review of SEC/AICPA literature should be 
performed to add major categories presently omitted, such as individuals’ family 
relationships and audit organization business relationships with the audited 
organization. 
 
D. Editorial suggestions –  
1. 3.17c.  As proposed, appraisal materiality appears to be based only on 
individual results (engagements?) – “of any valuation or appraisal.”  We 
believe another test should be applied against the aggregate of all such 
engagements. 
2. 3.17d.  This requirement seems to be directed to actuarial services for 
insurance matters and if that is the intent, it should be stated. If not, this 
paragraph needs to be reconciled with 3.17c. 
3. 3.17e.  We suggest this item start out:  “For example, the audit organization’s 
independence would be impaired if…” 
 
3.19  Regarding “inadvertent violations,” your proposal differs in a number of respects    
         from the related SEC rule at Regulation S-X, 2-01 (d).  For example:     
 
A. Did you intend to exempt inadvertent violations of the audit organization, as well as 
of individuals? 
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B. Should you specify that “inadvertent” only covers violations of the rules of which 
neither the individual nor the audit organization knew? 
C. A mitigating procedure is listed that “(1) the audit organization promptly removes 
the auditor from the assignment.”  Can the auditor return after the violation is 
corrected? 
 
3.20 “External Impairments” –We believe that these matters are more properly classified as 
restrictions on the scope of the audit, rather than as “independence” issues. 
 
3.24b.  Shouldn’t this preclude a government audit organization from being considered 
independent when auditing the same legislative body that appointed it? 
 
3.25b.  We agree with this requirement, but would add a requirement for the auditor to issue a 
report to the legislative body either agreeing with the reasons reported by the head of the 
agency or describing why he or she disagrees.  This is similar to the SEC’s requirement 
when an auditor is terminated or resigns. 
 
3.25f.  We would add “compensation and promotion” to the list of protections. 
 
3.27a.  We suggest additions so that the requirement would read “is accountable directly to the 
head or deputy head, or to the governing board, commission or similar entity, of the 
government entity.” 
 
3.30 ISB Standard No. 1, “Independence Discussions with Audit Committees,” mandates   
        a discussion of auditor independence between the auditor and the senior governance  
        body of the audited entity.  We recommend including in your guidance a similar  




Other –  
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It is not always clear whether the rule restrictions on the auditor apply at the level of the 
entity, or just of the activity or program. 
 
                                                         *   *   *   *   *   *                                                           
